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Abstract
We study tax policy in a Schumpeterian growth model with asym-
metric information in the financing of innovation. Investors cannot a
priori distinguish between more or less talented entrepreneurs. Net-
worth allows talented entrepreneurs to self-invest and avoid being pooled
with less talented entrepreneurs in the credit market. Increasing net-
worth boosts innovation even when financed through higher profit taxes.
Taxing consumption effectively raises net-worth and subsidizes profits
simultaneously. Sufficiently taxing consumption implements the social
optimum free of adverse selection. If forced to tax consumption less,
the government implements a second best allocation with adverse selec-
tion when boosting net-worth enough to avoid adverse selection requires
taxing profits excessively.
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1 Introduction
The private and social gains from technological research diverge in the presence
of externalities in the production and dissemination of innovation. The policy
prescription of the endogenous growth literature is simple: subsidize innova-
tion activity sufficiently to eliminate that wedge. However, there is substantial
evidence that firms face constraints in financing the pursuit, adoption, or ac-
quisition of innovations.1 In the presence of asymmetric information, providing
incentives to innovators does not necessarily lead to more innovation activity;
the government must also take into account the response of financial markets,
and prevent the adverse selection problem from constraining innovators.
In our model, some entrepreneurs are more talented than others, but their
talent is private information. When the market cannot separate these two
types, the demand for credit of untalented entrepreneurs raises the cost of
capital of talented entrepreneurs as creditors require compensation for the risk
of lending to the untalented. In other words, talented entrepreneurs must pay
an adverse selection premium. Indeed, even when the market can separate the
two types, the investment decisions of the high types are distorted by their
need to avoid being confused with the low types.
To study fiscal policy in this environment, we assume the government can
tax labor income, profit, and consumption. Our results about the effects of
tax policy reforms on economic growth depend crucially on whether financial
markets are in a pooling or separating equilibrium, and the design of optimal
policy hinges on which of those equilibria is most conducive to growth when
the first best allocation is not implementable.
We show that increasing the after-tax labor income of entrepreneurs is often
necessary to increase technological research while at the same time avoiding a
pooling equilibrium. The reason is that investable net-worth equals after-tax
labor income. With more resources at hand, talented entrepreneurs can pursue
more research without facing adverse selection. Thus, boosting net-worth pro-
vides a rationale for taxing profits in order to subsidize labor income. In our
model, moreover, taxing profits may lead to an overall increase in research,
1? and ? recently reviewed this evidence.
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because it may make it easier for high-talent entrepreneurs to differentiate
themselves from the low-talent ones. This starkly contrasts the benchmark
Schumpeterian growth model, wherein taxing profits could only result in a
decrease in research. Nonetheless, substituting labor income taxes with profit
taxes is not wholly effective, because eventually entrepreneurs become uncon-
strained by their relatively high net-worth and poor incentives. At that point,
the benchmark and our asymmetric information model behave identically, and
further increases in the profit tax are growth-reducing. In other words, there
is an inverted-U relationship between after-tax profit and innovation.2
Substituting labor income and profit taxes for consumption taxes, i.e. fun-
damental tax reform, more decidedly boosts technological research. Consump-
tion taxes do not hurt the incentive to innovate, as profit taxes do, nor do they
constrain the entrepreneur’s effort choice, as labor income taxes do. In fact,
when the government can freely tax consumption, it is able to implement the
first best level of technological research. Otherwise, the government must tax
profit and labor income more and implement a second best equilibrium at a
lower level of research.
Surprisingly, if the government is unable to tax consumption sufficiently,3
the second best equilibrium exhibits adverse selection. This happens because
implementing a separating equilibrium requires a low tax on labor income,
which given a low tax on consumption requires an excessively high tax on
profits to balance the government’s budget.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. The financial develop-
ment and economic growth literature (reviewed by ?), has incorporated finan-
cial frictions into endogenous growth models to understand, on the one hand,
2Incidentally, this provides an entirely different explanation for the inverted-U relation-
ship between competition and innovation found empirically by ?.
3There are important reasons to consider the effect of limits on consumption taxation.
With some exceptions, governments in middle to high income countries do not rely heavily
on consumption taxation. On average, taxes on goods and services make up only a third of
total tax revenues in OECD countries. Despite the emergence of a large literature arguing
in favor of fundamental tax reform, in some countries proposals to tilt the tax base towards
consumption have faced serious political difficulties. In Japan, the protracted and conflicted
efforts of several political parties to establish and raise consumption taxes provide a good
example.
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how the frictions affect economic growth and welfare, and on the other hand,
how financial institutions reduce these imperfections by providing risk-sharing,
screening, and monitoring services. For example, ? incorporate asymmetric
information about entrepreneurial quality into a Schumpeterian growth model.
However, they preclude adverse selection by introducing financial intermedi-
aries that pay a fee to screen entrepreneurs. The policy focus of this literature
has been to estimate the effects of government policies that induce financial
institutions to provide more of their services, and how these policies can have
long-lasting effects as they allow the economy to develop. Instead, we ask
how well the government can pursue policy despite the persistence of financial
frictions.
This is the first paper to consider the effect of adverse selection on tax
policy in a model of growth. ? develops a model of endogenous growth with
adverse selection to measure the negative impact of adverse selection on eco-
nomic growth, but does not consider policy. However, there are studies of the
impact of other financial frictions on growth policy. ? assume entrepreneurs
that pursue capital accumulation projects face a moral hazard problem: out-
side creditors are unable to claim more than the entrepreneur’s wealth at the
time the project is completed as payment. Taxing profits of rich entrepreneurs
to subsidize the net-worth of poor entrepreneurs increases growth because the
disincentive effect of the profit tax to the rich is secondary to the benefit of
alleviating the financial constraints of the poor. To contrast, our paper ra-
tionalizes a policy of taxing profits to subside net-worth without relying on a
financial constraint that heterogeneously affects entrepreneurs. ? show that
when risk-averse entrepreneurs face an un-diversifiable income stream stem-
ming from their research, unconditional transfers to entrepreneurs raise the
incentive to pursue research by lowering the marginal utility cost of failure.
However, if entrepreneurs were able to insure against their income risk, uncon-
ditional transfers would have no effect on research effort. Instead, in our model
an unconditional transfer would boost research effort even if entrepreneurs were
risk-averse and able to insure against income risk as long as adverse selection
constrained the entrepreneur’s effort.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the setup and
analyzes the case of perfect information. Section 3 develops the model of
asymmetric information, and analyzes the effects of small changes in policy.
Section 4 studies the optimal policy problem, and Section 5 concludes. Fur-
thermore, Appendix A completes the description of the model of section 2,
while Appendix B provides proofs to the lemmas and propositions within the
paper.
2 A Benchmark Model of Schumpeterian Growth
The basic structure of the economy imperfectly follows chapter 4.3 in ?. In this
section we intend only to explain the key ingredients of the innovation process
necessary to develop and understand the results of this paper. For a complete
description of the benchmark model, refer to Appendix A. Throughout the
paper, we only consider equilibria with a risk-free interest rate equal to zero
(r = 0) to simplify the analysis.
There are three types of tradable goods: consumption, a unit continuum
of intermediate products, and a unit continuum of industry-specific labor in-
puts. The intermediate and consumption goods perish each period. There
are two types of agents, entrepreneurs and consumers. All agents are com-
pletely informed about the model, themselves, and each other. Each agent
lives two periods, is able to provide a unit of industry-specific labor effort in
his first period of life, and maximizes expected consumption. While any agent
can start a business investing in, and producing, existing intermediate goods,
only entrepreneurs are capable of pursuing technological research innovating
on existing intermediate goods.
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Figure 2.1: Benchmark Model Timeline
At the beginning of period t, in each industry one entrepreneur and L− 1
consumers are born. Also present are one entrepreneur and L − 1 consumers
born in period t− 1. Each industry is monopolized by a single producer, who
owns the blueprint of the technologically-superior intermediate good. When
the industry innovated in period t − 1, the monopoly is held by the old en-
trepreneur, otherwise it is held by a random old consumer who inherited the
blueprint from the previous owner.4
A perfectly competitive sector produces the consumption good, employing
the entire spectrum of industry-specific labor and intermediate goods. From
the consumption good producers, the young agents receive a wage and the
intermediate good producers receive payments for their goods. In turn, old
agents who invested at t − 1 in the intermediate good producers receive the
return on their investment.
At this point in the timeline, the only good trading in the economy is the
consumption good. Young agents may either consume their entire net wage,
or lend to young entrepreneurs investing in research or to young consumers
investing in production of intermediate goods for period t + 1. In sequence,
young entrepreneurs choose how much of the consumption good to invest in
research, and how much of it to contribute in equity as opposed to external
financing. Afterward, the outcome of research is revealed. Also, the techno-
logically superior producer (and monopolist) at t passes on his blueprint to a
4Think of this consumer as the descendant of the last entrepreneur to innovate; he lacks
entrepreneurial talent and behaves as a consumer.
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young consumer. Then, the technologically superior producer at t+ 1 will ei-
ther be the young entrepreneur at t if he innovated or the young consumer who
inherited the best technology at t. The young entrepreneurs and consumers
now decide how much of the consumption good to invest in production of the
intermediate good, while the old consume and die. The young consume the
remainder of the stock not invested in research or intermediate good produc-
tion. Period t ends, and period t+ 1 begins with the birth of a new generation
of agents.
Uniformly throughout the model, industry variables are denoted by a cap-
ital Roman letter with an index i, e.g. Xi. Industry variables adjusted by
industry frontier productivity Ai are denoted by the lower case, e.g. xi ≡ XiAi .
Aggregate (or average) variables drop the index, e.g. X ≡ ´ 1
0
Xidi, and these
variables adjusted for average productivity are denoted by the lower case with-
out the index, e.g. x ≡ X
A
.
2.1 The Set of Policy Instruments
Suppose the government employs a time-invariant set of tax schedules on labor,
consumption, and profit. We assume taxes take the form of quantity-invariant
proportional rates, so that tax burdens vary linearly with agents’ choices and
the analysis remains tractable. Notably, we do not allow for taxes on capital
gains, production, or investment. Including a larger set of taxes would distract
the reader from the main points of this paper, without enough additional
insights.5
We assume all agents are taxed at equivalent rates and denote the set of
tax rates by τ . An element of the set receives a subscript representative of the





. The government cannot require a payment
5A capital gains tax is similar to a profit tax; they both reduce an entrepreneur’s incentive
to pursue research. Production taxes, by manipulating the revenue and cost of producing
intermediate goods, would be able to rectify the appropriability problem caused by monopoly
power, a well known result that does not interact in an interesting way with the messages of
the paper. A tax on investment, like a profit tax, reduces the incentive to pursue research,
but it also discourages production of intermediates thus unnecessarily complicating the
analysis.
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higher than the labor income or profit being taxed, i.e. τw, τpi,∈ (−∞, 1].
Additionally, if the tax rates were so generous as to imply a zero or negative
price of consumption the agents would choose to consume unboundedly, so in
order for an equilibrium to exist it must be that τc ∈ (−1,∞).
The equilibrium concept for the game between the government and the
agents is a static Nash Equilibrium with a first-mover advantage for the gov-
ernment. The government first submits a time-invariant schedule of tax rates
τ . Second, the agents choose their best responses to the government’s tax
plan.
2.2 Research and Innovation
Entrepreneurs can be of two types, high talent (H) and low talent (L). The
entrepreneur’s type is independently drawn in each industry and period. With
probability 1
2
the entrepreneur born in industry i at time t is a high type, with
probability 1
2
he is a low type.
If the young entrepreneur of type J ∈ {H,L} commits Zit consumption
goods to research, the technology of industry i at t+ 1 obeys
Ai,t+1 =















is an increasing concave function of its argument, µ (0) = 0,
aHµ (∞) ≤ 1, aH > aL > 0, and γ > 1. Technology Ait corresponds to
the productivity with which workers born into industry i at time t produce
consumption goods. More formally, given inputs of L labor-units and Xit






1−αXαitdi, 0 < α < 1;
innovations thus raise the demand for intermediate goods.
If the entrepreneur innovates, he becomes the intermediate good monop-
olist and earns profits. Otherwise, he earns nothing. An intermediate good
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monopolist earns profits
Πi,t+1 = (1− α)α
1+α
1−αAi,t+1L,
in period t + 1, by investing consumption goods in period t, and later selling
intermediate goods to competitive consumption good producers at a marked-
up price.
Young entrepreneurs can finance their research by contributing equity, or
by borrowing from other young agents. If they borrow, entrepreneurs only
repay their debt when the project is successful. Because investment in research
is risky, it must pay an interest rate higher than the risk-free rate r = 0. Since
lenders are competitive, in expectation risk-neutral lenders receive exactly the






, this means having to repay one over this amount (per each dollar
borrowed) in case of success.
So, the pre-consumption-tax net present value (NPV) of the project for an
entrepreneur of type J contributing Eit in equity is
















Πi,t+1 (1− τpi)− Zit,
which does not depend on Eit.6
Because an entrepreneur that becomes an intermediate good producer ad-
vances productivity by step γ, and given that the solution to the intermediate
good producer’s problem implies productivity-adjusted profits are constant
across industries and over time, adjusting NPV Jit for productivity Ait implies
npvJit (zit |τpi ) = aJµ (zit) γpi (1− τpi)− zit.
6To keep the model tractable, we abstract from the issue of deductibility of interest
payments.
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The entrepreneur’s optimal choice of productivity-adjusted effort satisfies the
first order condition
1 = aJµ
′ (zit) γpi (1− τpi) , (2.1)
and is hence constant across industries with the same type of entrepreneur,
and over time. We now drop the it subscript, and let zJ denote productivity-
adjusted effort by an entrepreneur of type J , and zˆJ(τpi) his optimal effort. It
is easy to see that zˆH(τpi) > zˆL(τpi).
All else equal, lowering the tax rate on profit encourages research. The
consumption tax rate has no effect on research because it symmetrically af-
fects the costs and benefits of the decision (this is why we express NPV in
pre-consumption-tax value units). Additionally, because capital markets are
perfect, the effort decision is independent of the extent of equity financing and
thus of the entrepreneur’s wealth. Consequently, the labor tax rate does not
impact research effort either.
2.3 Aggregation and the Government Budget Constraint
Let “industry of type J” indicate an industry in which the entrepreneur is of
type J . Aggregation is considerably simplified by the linear dependence of
industry-specific variables on productivity.














of industries innovate each period. Since the allocation of talent and the
outcome of research are independent across industries, and they do not depend
on industry productivity, we can write the evolution of average productivity
as
At+1 = µ (zH , zL) γAt + (1− µ (zH , zL))At = (1 + µ (zH , zL) (γ − 1))At.
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The analysis in this paper restricts itself to comparisons across balanced
growth paths since r = 0 ensures there are no transitional dynamics in this
model. On a balanced growth path, all aggregate variables grow at the same
rate as average productivity:
g (zH , zL) ≡ 1 + µ (zH , zL) (γ − 1) .
Consider the taxable flows. There is a unit measure of monopolists, each
making productivity-adjusted profits pi, and there are L agents working in each
industry, each earning productivity-adjusted labor income w. Productivity-
adjusted aggregate consumption c satisfies
c = y − i (zH , zL)− z, (2.2)
where y is productivity-adjusted aggregate output and i (zH , zL) is the productivity-
adjusted aggregate quantity of consumption goods invested into the produc-






The government has an exogenous spending requirement, St ≥ 0 that also
exogenously grows at a rate g. Government spending is akin to destroying
resources: it produces no utility nor economic benefit to the agents.
A set of tax schedules must imply net tax transfers that satisfy the gov-
ernment budget constraint, given by
τpipi + τwLw + τcc = s, (2.3)
where s is productivity-adjusted government spending.
7This assumes, without loss of generality, that any consumption good left over after
research and investment is immediately consumed. See Appendix A for a derivation of w, y
and i (zH , zL).
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3 A Model of Asymmetric Information
Now suppose that the entrepreneur’s type is private information. In this asym-
metric information environment, the low types may have an incentive to mimic
the high types’ choice of self-investment and leverage, in order to pay a lower
interest rate. Because a lower rate only applies to external financing, the low
types’ gains from mimicking decrease with self-investment by the high types,
and increases with their leverage. At the expense of scale, the high types
can strategically differentiate themselves from the low types by contributing
as much as possible to their projects and choosing a low leverage ratio. Oth-
erwise, the high types can pursue a large project while paying an adverse
selection premium on borrowed funds.8 It turns out there also exists a third
equilibrium in which the high types can differentiate themselves by choosing
an excessively high leverage ratio. In the first part of this section, we de-
scribe the first two equilibria in an intuitive way (their formal derivation is
provided in Appendix B). We conclude the section by briefly describing the
third equilibrium.
If zˆH(τpi) ≤ (1− τw)w, asymmetric information does not affect investment
decisions, since all entrepreneurs have enough net worth to finance their opti-
mal investment decisions through equity contributions. It is then zJ = zˆJ(τpi)
as in the model with perfect information.9 We then only need to consider
the case (1 − τw)w < zˆH(τpi). In what follows, we express all variables in
productivity-adjusted terms.
8The intuition of this setup is akin to ?. In that paper, because self-investment limits
an entrepreneur’s ability to diversify, the entrepreneur can credibly signal the quality of his
project by owning a larger share of its equity. In this paper, because relying of outside
financing can attract low-talent entrepreneurs posing as high-talent ones, cause adverse
selection, and hence raise the high-talent entrepreneur’s financing costs, the high-talent
entrepreneur can credibly signal the quality of his project by contributing a large enough
share of the research capital.
9More precisely, there only exists a separating equilibrium in which zJ = zˆJ(τpi), with
any combination of equity and external financing being possible. See Appendix B for more
details.
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3.1 The Low Type’s Problem
When lenders are unable to observe entrepreneurial talent, low-talent en-





on external financing. For a separating equilibium
to exist in which type J pays interest rate 1
aJµ(z)
, such an incentive cannot be
in place. Based on this requirement, we now derive a first necessary condition
for a separating equilibrium.
In any separating equilibrium, the low-types must choose their optimal
effort with perfect information, zˆL(τpi).10 Consider a separating equilibrium in
which the high types invest z > (1− τw)w, contributing their entire after-tax
labor income as equity. Then, the condition for the low types not to mimic
the high types (and for this separating equilibrium to exist) is




[z − (1− τw)w]
}
− (1− τw)w
= aLµ(z)γpi(1− τpi)− aL
aH
[z − (1− τw)w]− (1− τw)w
≤ npvL(zˆL(τpi)|τpi). (3.1)
The term n˜pvL (z|τpi, τw) is the net present value of the project for a low-
talent entrepreneur who successfully mimic a high-talent one. It must be lower
than the low type’s net present value from investing zˆL(τpi), or else the low type
would mimic the high type, and the separating equilibrium would collapse.
The bottom two lines of Figure 3.1 illustrate. The solid line is the low type’s
net present value with perfect information. Because the probability function
µ (.) is increasing and strictly concave while the research cost is linear, the
curve increases at a diminishing rate at first, reaches a unique maximum at
zˆL(τpi), and then decreases. At a separating equilibrium, the low type obtains
payoff npvL(zˆL(τpi)|τpi). The dashed line represents the payoff that the low
type could obtain by successfully mimicking a high type. The low type does
10To see this, suppose zL 6= zˆL(τpi) at a separating equilibrium. Since this is a separating
equilibrium, the low types would have to be offered rate 1aLµ(zˆL(τpi)) , and their payoff would
have to be npv(zL|τpi). But, by choosing zˆL(τpi), they could have not been offered a higher
rate in equilibrium, and they would have thus obtained at least npv(zˆL(τpi)|τpi) > npv(zL|τpi).
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Figure 3.1: High type is strategically constrained
not have an incentive to mimic if z is low (between (1 − τw)w and zsep) but
if it is high (immediately above zsep), then he does. Intuitively, a high z is
associated with a high level of leverage of high-talent entrepreneurs, and this
attracts a low-talent entrepreneur who is less likely to repay his debt.
Note that the decision to mimic depends on the profit tax rate, which
affects the low type’s incentive to conduct research, and on the labor tax rate,
which affects the high type’s leverage and thus the low type’s incentive to
mimic. In constrast, the consumption tax rate does not affect the decision to
mimic because it applies to the decision’s benefits and costs symmetrically:
post-consumption-tax, both sides of equation 3.1 are divided by 1 + τc.
Before continuing, we formally define zsep as the minimum solution to
n˜pvL (z|τpi, τw) = npvL(zˆL(τpi)|τpi),
or zsep = zˆH(τpi) if such solution does not exists. The full properties of zsep are
derived in Appendix B. Here, it is sufficient to note that, in the range where a
separating equilibrium exists, zˆH(τpi) ≥ zsep > (1 − τw)w, and it is increasing
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in (1− τw)w before reaching its maximum.
3.2 The High Type’s Problem
In the separating equilibrium discussed in the previous section, the high-talent
entrepreneurs cannot invest more than zsep, or else the low types would want
to mimic them. A second condition for the separating equilibrium to exist is
that the high-talent entrepreneurs prefer to pursue less research but to be in
a separating equilibrium without adverse selection, than to choose a higher
research effort with adverse selection. Suppose lenders believe that those in-
vesting more than zsep (and contributing their entire income as equity) are
high and low types with equal probability. They then require a payment 1
aµ(z)
,





aL) from any borrower to compensate for the risk of loaning
to an entrepreneur of average talent. The high types’ decision hinges on the
relative benefit of a higher probability of innovation if they invest more than
zsep, versus the higher costs of financing that adverse selection entails. The
condition for the high types to prefer to avoid adverse selection is




[z − (1− τw)w]
}
− (1− τw)w
= aHµ(z)γpi(1− τpi)− aH
a
[z − (1− τw)w]− (1− τw)w
≤ npvH(zsep|τpi),
for all z > zsep. The term npvHpool(z|τpi, τw) is the net present value of the
project for a high-talent entrepreneur whom lenders cannot distinguish from
a low type. For all z > zsep, it must be lower than the entrepreneur’s net
present value when investing zsep, or else the high type would choose z and
the separating equilibrium would collapse. The top two lines of Figure 3.1
illustrate. The thin solid line (partially covered by a thick line to be discussed
momentarily) is the high type’s net present value with perfect information.
With perfect information, the high type maximises such value by selecting
effort zˆH(τpi). With asymmetric information, the high type can invest up to
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Figure 3.2: High type is unconstrained
zsep at perfect information interest rate, or invest more and face a higher cost
of financing due to adverse selection. His payoff in the latter case is represented
by the dashed line (also partially covered by a thick solid line). At the effort
threshold zsep, the dashed line is always lower than the solid line, due to the
adverse selection premium the entrepreneur must pay on the amount borrowed
- the difference between net-worth and the effort threshold. The slope of the
curve is also smaller, since the marginal cost of research on it is aH
a
> 1.
With asymmetric information, the high types select the level of effort that
maximises the function represented by the thick solid line. The solution to
the high type’s optimal effort problem has two cases, where the entrepreneur’s
choice of effort is either equal to, or above zsep. Figure 3.1 represents the
first case. Here zsep is high enough that the entrepreneur prefers to avoid
adverse selection, and a separating equilibrium exists. The entrepreneur is
said to be strategically constrained, in the sense that even if he does not pay
the adverse selection premium, his choice is affected by it: he is forced to
invest less than with perfect information, and must pay a higher interest rate
16





). Note that the entrepreneur does not need to be
strategically constrained at a separating equilibrium. In Figure 3.2, (1− τw)w
is so high that the low types never find it optimal to mimic the high types.
In this case, zsep = zˆH(τpi), and the adverse selection problem is irrelevant.
The entrepreneur is unconstrained. The second case is represented in Figure
3.3. Here, zsep is so low that the high types decides to put more effort into
innovation even if this implies paying an adverse selection premium. The
high-talent entrepreneur is constrained.
In the last case, the separating equilibrium collapses. We show in the
Appendix that there then exists a pooling equilibrium in which the high types
maximise npvHpool(z|τpi, τw), and the low types maximise a similar function with
aH replaced everywhere by aL. Optimal effort by type J satisfies
1 = aµ′ (z) γpi (1− τpi) , (3.2)
and is thus the same for the two types. We denote such a level of effort by
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zˆpool(τpi), where zˆL(τpi) < zˆpool(τpi) < zˆH(τpi). We show in Appendix B that,
at the minimum zsep such that the high type is strategically constrained, it is
zˆL(τpi) < (1− τw)w < zsep < zˆpool(τpi).
As this discussion suggests, the threshold zsep plays a key role in determin-
ing the equilibrium. If it is equal to zˆH(τpi) or just below it, the high types are,
respectively, unconstrained and strategically constrained; if it gets closer to
zˆL(τpi), or falls below it, the high types are constrained. What is important is
that zsep is an increasing function of the amount of equity that the high types
are able to contribute, (1−τw)w. The tax on labor, then, is a key determinant
of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1. There exist τw and τw, with −∞ < τw < τw < 1 such that:
• If τw ≤ τw, the high types are unconstrained: a separating equilibrium
realises, where zsep = zˆH(τpi).
• If τw ∈ (τw, τw], the high types are strategically constrained: a separating
equilibrium realises, where zsep ∈ (zˆL(τpi), zˆH(τpi)).
• If τw > τw, the high types are constrained: a pooling equilibrium realises.
If τw ∈ (τw, τw], zsep is decreasing in τw, increasing in τpi.
It is worth highlighting that, for τw ∈ (τw, τw], the threshold zsep - and
thus investment by the high types - is increasing in τpi. The intuition for
this surprising result is as follows. On the one hand, since the high types are
strategically constrained, they are not constrained by their incentives to do
research: thus, an increase in τpi does not induce them to invest less. On the
other hand, an increase in τpi weakens the incentives for the low types to do
research. This makes it less attractive for them to mimic the high types, since
to do so would involve investing even more in research.
This suggests a more general result: when the high types are strategically
constrained, lower profit margins (lower pi) may increase innovation, because
they lead to more “survival of the fittest”: low-talent entrepreneurs will invest
less (a lower zˆL(τpi)), but high-talent entrepreneurs will invest more (a higher
zsep).
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This result is important, because it suggests a new way to reconcile Schum-
peterian theory with the empirical finding described in ? of an inverted-U rela-
tionship between product market competition and innovation. In the standard
Schumpeterian model, more competition, as captured by a lower pi, always re-
duces innovation (e.g. ?, p. 90-92). Now consider our model, and suppose we
are at a separating equilibrium with zsep < zˆH(τpi). When competition is low
(and pi is high), agents have a strong incentive to conduct research. Because
of asymmetric information, however, there is also a strong incentive for the
low types to mimic the high types, which leads to little investment by the
latter. In terms of Figure 3.1, the two npv lines are quite steep, and, on the
opposite sides of (1− τw)w, zˆL(τpi) is high and zsep is low. Now suppose that
competition begins to increase, so that profit margins narrow. By inducing
more survival of the fittest (a lower zˆL(τpi) and a higher zsep), this may increase
innovation. However, this positive relation between competition and innova-
tion cannot last. As competition increases further, the high types eventually
become unconstrained. After this point, further increases in competition must
reduce the amount of innovation, since they weaken the incentives of both
types to conduct research.11
3.3 The Effects of Tax Policy
It is apparent from equations (2.1) and (3.2) that both at a separating and at a
pooling equilibrium, the low types’ optimal research effort only depends on the
tax on profit. A similar logic applies to the high types at a separating equilib-
rium in which they are unconstrained, or at a pooling equilibrium. However,
at a separating equilibrium where the high-types are strategically constrained,
the response of their research effort to a policy change is determined by the
impact of the change on the threshold effort zsep. According to Lemma 1, the
only way to raise the high type’s research effort in this case is to lower the tax
on labor income, or to increase the tax on profit. This leads to the following
11Our result that zˆL(τpi) and zsep move further apart as competition increases resonates
with the other empirical finding in ?, that more competitive industries are less “neck-and-
neck”. But we do not want to push this point here.
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proposition.
Proposition 2. Lowering the tax on profit always boosts research effort by
the low types, and by the high types at a separating equilibrium in which
they are unconstrained (zsep = zˆH(τpi)), or at a pooling equilibrium. At a
separating equilibrium in which the high types are strategically constrained
(zsep < zˆH(τpi)), lowering the labor income tax boosts their research effort,
and so does increasing the tax on profit.
Proposition 2 has multiple interpretations. First, there may be a motive
for redistribution from established business owners to workers, since it may be
beneficial to tax profits to subsidize labor income. This happens when the high
types are strategically constrained, if the benefit from more research by the
high types outweighs the cost of less research by the low types. This benefit
of redistribution stems from the asymmetric information problem. Thinking
further, however, increasing profit taxes cannot be an effective way to increase
research effort very much, since as taxes keep increasing eventually high-talent
entrepreneurs become unconstrained by their relatively high net-worth and
poor incentives, at which point further increases in the profit tax are growth-
reducing. On the other hand, taxing consumption to finance reductions in the
tax rates on labor avoids this limitation. It relaxes the financial constraints of
the high-types without worsening the incentives of the low types, nor those of
the high-types after they become unconstrained. It thus unambiguously spurs
innovation and growth.12
This leads to another subtle and important interpretation of the propo-
sition. If governments believe financial constraints hold back entrepreneurial
activity, they should restructure their sources of tax revenue. They should rely
on consumption rather than income taxation.13 This result resonates with the
12? make a related point when studying the effects of tax policy on the decisions of fi-
nancially constrained farmers. They argue that lowering the income tax allows constrained
farmers to accumulate networth faster while a consumption tax does not distort their in-
vestment decisions, so that as a net result replacing the income tax with a consumption tax
relaxes farmers’ financing constraints.
13Of course, this result is special to the the assumptions of this model. Consumption
taxes neither cause tax evasion nor do they interact with labor effort (there is no disutility
of labor).
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literature on fundamental tax reform, which has for some time argued in fa-
vor of transitioning from an income-based to a consumption-based tax system
(e.g., ?). Our paper proposes a new channel through which tax reform may
improve efficiency: namely, it may increase the innovation rate, helping to
rectify the endogenous growth externalities that tend to make it smaller than
the social optimum.
3.4 An Alternative Separating Equilibrium
The separating equilibrium discussed so far is supported by the belief that
those who invest more than zsep (contributing their entire income as equity)
are high and low types with equal probability. However, when we challenge
this belief using standard dominance-based refinements, as in ?, p. 469, we
find that it needs to be qualified as follows: lenders should, in addition, believe
that those who invest more than some zsep ≥ zˆH(τpi) (contributing their entire
income as equity) are high types. The intuition is straightforward. In Figure
3.1, the curve n˜pvL cuts the dotted horizontal line twice, at zsep and at some
zsep ≥ zˆH(τpi). If an entreprenur invested more than z > zsep, he would
reasonably have to be a high type, since that action is dominated for the low
types for any interest rate that they may be offered in equilibrium.
Once we refine the lenders’ beliefs in such a way, the strategically con-
strained high types have an additional option: they can choose zsep (still con-
tributing their entire income in equity), and differentiate themselves through
an excessively high leverage ratio that no low-talent entrepreneur would dare to
undertake. At this alternative option, the high types pay a lower interest rate




). It turns out that the
high types are exactly indifferent between this new option and zsep, and it is
then impossible to predict which one they will choose in equilibrium.14 There
could be industries in which the high types choose zsep in equilibrium, and
others in which they choose zsep. This multiplicity of equilibria only applies to





(1 − τw)w. Then, npvH(z) is a linear transformation of n˜pvL(z), and n˜pvL(zsep) =
n˜pvL(zsep) implies npvH(zsep) = npvH(zsep).
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the case of strategically constrained high types, while the other two cases are
unchanged. Also unchanged are the thresholds for τw that determine which
case is the relevant one, as enunciated by Lemma 1. Finally, it is possible
to prove that no other separating equilibrium survives the dominance-based
refinements mentioned above.15
If we adopt this multiplicity of equilibria, our results need to be qualified.
First and foremost, the discussion in the last two sections only partially applies
to industries in which a strategically constrained high type selects effort zsep.
To see why, note that, symmetrically to zsep, zsep is increasing in τw, decreasing
in τpi. In those industries, then, a higher tax on profit (or higher competition)
leads to a lower research effort by the entrepreneur, just like in the standard
Schumpeterian model (though in our model the entrepreneur actually gains
from the change, since he can get closer to his optimal investment level).
However, it is still true that the government benefits from a greater capacity to
tax consumption, since this allows it to independently influence research by the
two types of entrepreneurs. This last point will also imply that optimal policy,
the next focus of our attention, is qualitatively unaffected by the multiplicity
of equilibria. To the discussion of optimal policy we now turn.
4 Optimal Policy
In the standard Schumpeterian growth model where there is no informational
friction and financial markets are perfect, the labor income of entrepreneurs
does not affect their research effort, and hence nor does the extent to which
the government taxes their labor income. Consequently, the government can
implement the first best allocation by taxing labor income to finance profit
subsidies, independent on any restriction on consumption taxation.
With asymmetric information, however, because the government must jointly
15Intuitively, to contribute (1− τw)w in equity and select z ∈ ((1− τw)w, zsep] or z ≥ zsep
is a dominated action for the low types. It follows that beliefs cannot allocate a positive
probability to them undertaking such actions, which are then all available to the high types
at any separating equilibrium. Then, at any separating equilibrium, the high types must
contribute (1− τw)w in equity, and select zsep or zsep.
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subsidize labor income and profits to implement the first best allocation, the
government relies more on consumption taxation. Consequently, we show how
restricting the government’s ability to tax consumption leads to a second best
situation in which the first best allocation is not implementable and why in
the face of a severe restriction on consumption taxation the government finds
it optimal to implement an equilibrium with adverse selection.
4.1 First Best Allocation
The government behaves as a social planner whose objective is to maximize the
expected total consumption across time (and generations) discounted at rate









c (zH , zL)
1− βg (zH , zL) .
Since productivity-adjusted investment increases with research effort (see
Appendix A), equation (2.2) implies productivity-adjusted consumption un-







the other hand, the growth rate of productivity increases with research effort,
and hence so does the denominator of the objective. First best research effort
by type J , z∗J is given by
z∗J = arg max
zJ












β (γ − 1) c (z∗H , z∗L)
1− βg (z∗H , z∗L)
. (4.1)
As before, denote by zˆJ (τpi) the entrepreneur’s privately-optimal research




the private research effort equation under laissez-faire. As in ?, there are four
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effects that determine the disparity between the private and social returns to
innovation. First, an entrepreneur only considers the one-period ahead value
of innovation, while the government values the entire discounted stream of
future benefits (“spillover effect”). Second, the government measures the effect
of innovation on consumption c rather than profit pi; this is called the ap-
propriability effect. Third, the government accounts for the business-stealing
effect by scaling the consumption gain by γ − 1 rather than γ. Fourth, the
monopoly distortion effect implies that the monopolist looks at the private
cost rather than the social cost of research. The spillover and appropriability
effects tend to make laissez-faire research lower than the optimum, while the
business-stealing and monopoly distortion effects push research effort up. The
net direction depends on the strength of each effect.
From equation (4.1), we see that, at the first best allocation,16
aHµ
′ (z∗H) = aLµ
′ (z∗L) , (4.2)
which implies z∗H > z∗L. It is socially optimal that high-talent entrepreneurs,
who are more likely to be successful, invest more in research.
4.2 Model with Perfect Information
Consider first the benchmark model with perfect information. Under what
conditions is the first best implementable?
Definition. Policy τ ∗ implements the first best research effort z∗H , z∗L in the
model with perfect information if (a) τ ∗pi satisfies
1 = aJµ
′ (z∗J) γpi (1− τ ∗pi) , (4.3)
for J = {H,L}, and (b) the policy τ ∗ satisfies the government budget con-
straint (2.3).
16Since −∂c(z∗H ,z∗L)∂z∗J = α
2
1−α (γ − 1) 12aJµ′(z∗J)L + 12 , (4.1) can be written as 1aJµ′(z∗J) =
β(γ−1)c(z∗H ,z∗L)
1−βg(z∗H ,z∗L)
− α 21−α (γ − 1)L.
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Equation (4.2) implies that vector τ ∗ exists, since there exists τ ∗pi such that
equation (4.3) holds for both types of entrepreneurs. Given τ ∗pi , the government
budget constraint requires the tax rates on labor and consumption to balance
the budget. But, with perfect information, these adjustments do not impact
research effort. So, any feasible combination of taxes on labor and consumption
able to finance τ ∗pi implements the optimal policy.
Although both labor and consumption taxes can be used to implement the
first best, governments for either political or practical reasons only rely so much
on consumption taxes. It is more likely that, were the government to seriously
attempt to narrow the gap between the private and social returns to research,
the source of revenue would be income taxes. The following assumption ensures
that the use of the consumption tax is not necessary to implement the first best
allocation in the benchmark model and in the special case of a zero interest
rate to which this paper restricts itself.
Assumption 3. The first best allocation z∗H , z∗L is higher than laissez-faire
(z∗H > zˆH(0), z∗L > zˆL(0)), but low enough such that if the government [in the
benchmark model] finances the profit subsidy required to implement it solely
through a tax on labor income, the agents’ research and investment choices are
consistent with a risk-free interest rate equal to zero.
Assumption 3 ensures that, no matter how severe a restriction on con-
sumption taxes the government faces, the first best is implementable in the
benchmark model. Then, the only impediment to implementing the first best
allocation is the constraint imposed on tax rates by the adverse selection prob-
lem (see the next section).
4.3 Model with Asymmetric Information
Now consider the model with asymmetric information. The potential adverse
selection problem has no effect on the first best allocation. It remains true
that, if the government was able to, it would want to induce the first best
allocation. However, we show that the government can only implement the
first best in the absence of severe restrictions on consumption taxation.
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It is also possible that, in pursuing its optimal policy, the government
decides to allow for a pooling equilibrium with adverse selection. In this type
of equilibrium, the socially optimal research effort by the high types must be
lower than at the first best, because their effort is exactly (and wastefully)
replicated by the low types. We call the optimal allocation among pooling
equilibria with adverse selection the constrained first best allocation, as it is
conceptually similar to the first best allocation, but accounts for the resource
loss from the excessive investment by the low types.
We begin by discussing implementability of the first best. We then derive
the constrained first best. Finally, we turn to the second best allocation in the
presence of an exogenous restriction on the rate of consumption taxation.
4.3.1 First Best
Definition. Policy τ ∗sep implements the first best research effort z∗H , z∗L in a
separating equilibrium with no adverse selection if (a) τ ∗pi,sep = τ ∗pi , (b) τ ∗w,sep ≤
τw, and (b) the policy τ ∗sep satisfies the government budget constraint (2.3).
The tax rate on profit guarantees that entrepreneurs want to choose their
first best research effort. By Lemma 1, the requirement of a low enough labor
income tax rate, τ ∗w,sep ≤ τw, guarantees that both low-talent and high-talent
entrepreneurs are free to choose their first best research effort. Policy τ ∗sep then
implements the first best, and is feasible because it satisfies the government
budget constraint.
In the model with asymmetric information, implementation of the first best
depends not only upon generous profit subsidies (that boost private incentives
to research to the first best level) but also upon low labor income tax rates
(that give the high types enough net worth to pursue their private incentives).
Thus, the balancing of the budget constraint relies on consumption taxes, and
the extractive power of the consumption tax is key to implementation.
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4.3.2 Constrained First Best
Suppose we are at a pooling equilibrium. If z is the research effort common
to all entrepreneurs, aggregate consumption cpool (z) is
cpool (z) = y − ipool (z)− z,
where ipool(z) ≡ i(z, z). The government’s welfare function becomes
vpool (z) ≡ c
pool (z)
1− βgpool (z) ,
where gpool (z) = g (z, z). Define the constrained first best allocation, z∗pool, as
the level of research effort that the government would like to implement if it
presumes financial markets are at a pooling equilibrium, i.e.








) = β (γ − 1) cpool (z∗pool)
1− βgpool (z∗pool) . (4.4)
Conditional on inducing a pooling equilibrium with adverse selection, the
constrained first best allocation is the socially-optimal allocation. It is possible
to show that, as anticipated, z∗pool < z∗H : at a pooling equilibrium where the
low types invest as much as the high types, the first best level of research effort
by the high types is higher than socially optimal.17
We next turn to implementation:
Definition. Policy τ ∗pool implements the constrained first best research effort
z∗pool in a pooling equilibrium with adverse selection if (a) τ ∗pi,pool satisfies


















− α 21−α (γ − 1)L, and compare it to the
expression in footnote (16). Since the RHS of the present expression is lower, the LHS must




















(b) τ ∗w,pool > τw, and (c) the policy τ ∗pool satisfies the government budget con-
straint (2.3).
The tax rate on profit guarantees that, conditional on a pooling equilibrium
realising, entrepreneurs choose the constrained first best research effort. By
Lemma 1, the requirement of a high enough labor income tax rate, τ ∗w,pool > τw,
guarantees that a pooling equilibrium realises. Policy τ ∗pool then implements
the constrained first best, and is feasible because it satisfies the government
budget constraint. It is easy to show that the profit subsidy (could be a tax)
needed to implement the constrained first best is lower than the subsidy needed
to implement the first best, τ ∗pi,pool > τ ∗pi .18
In the model with asymmetric information, Assumption 3 does not guaran-
tee that the first best allocation is implementable independent of any restric-
tion on consumption taxes. This allows discussion of second best allocations
when the government cannot freely tax consumption. However, it also does not
guarantee that the constrained first best allocation is implementable indepen-
dent of any restriction on consumption taxes, which complicates the analysis of
second best allocations. In order to ensure the constrained first best allocation
is implementable, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Given the tax rates on profit and wages required to implement
the constrained first best allocation without taxing consumption, the agents’
research and investment choices are consistent with a risk-free interest rate
equal to zero.
It is possible to show, as we do in Appendix A, that the tax rates mentioned
in Assumption 4 always exist. In other words, there always exist tax rates
on profit and wages that implement the constrained first best without taxing
consumption. Assumption 4 additionally ensures that such rates are consistent
with a zero risk-free interest rate.










γpi(1− τ∗pi,pool) = aHµ′ (z∗H) γpi(1− τ∗pi) = 1.
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Because of Assumption 4, no matter how severe a restriction on consump-
tion taxes the government faces, the constrained first best allocation is im-
plementable. This simplifies considering second best policy in the presence of
a restriction on the consumption tax, because any candidate equilibria with
adverse selection other than the constrained first best cannot be optimal.
4.3.3 Second Best Allocation
Now we describe how optimal tax policy and the corresponding allocation
varies with an exogenous restriction on the rate of consumption taxation. Sup-
pose the consumption tax is restricted to be no greater than τ c ∈ [0,∞). To
find the second best tax policy, we first need to find the best implementable
allocation in a separating equilibrium with no adverse selection, and then com-
pare it to the constrained first best.
Let τ ∗sep be the consumption-tax-minimizing policy that implements the




[s− τ ∗pipi − τwwL] .
If the exogenous restriction on the rate of consumption taxation allows
for this policy, τ c ≥ τ ∗c,sep, the government is able to implement the first best
allocation in a separating equilibrium free of adverse selection.
If τ c < τ ∗c,sep, the government cannot implement the first best in a sepa-
rating equilibrium. To illustrate the trade off involved in the identification of
the best implementable separating equilibrium, consider the following experi-
ment. Suppose the government is initially implementing the first best through
tax vector τ ∗sep, when the exogenous restriction on the rate of consumption
taxation drops to a level τpi < τ ∗c,sep. To preserve budget balance, the gov-
ernment must increase at least one of τw and τpi. If it only increases τw, by
Lemma 1, the effort threshold zsep shifts in, making the high types strategi-
cally constrained. Effort by the high types decreases, whereas effort by the
low types stays constant. If, instead, the government increases τw slightly less,
compensating with a slight increase in τpi, the inward shift in the threshold
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zsep is less pronounced. Effort by the high types decreases less, while effort
by the low types also decreases. In any industry where the high types select
zsep, the government faces a similar trade-off, since any increase in τw pushes
zsep out, further away from the social optimum. The identification of the best
implementable separating equilibrium requires a balancing act between these
two alternative ways to cope with a less generous consumption taxation.
Denote by vsep welfare at the best implementable separating equilibrium.
We express this as a function of the constraint that makes it necessary to
implement the second best, τ c, and the exogenous spending requirement that
puts additional pressure on the government budget, s.
Lemma 5. The function vsep(τ c, s) is non-decreasing in τ c, non-increasing in
s. It is vsep(τ c, s) = v(τ ∗H , τ ∗L) for τ c ≥ τ ∗c,sep.
Results in Lemma 5 are intuitive. If the exogenous limit on the consump-
tion tax decreases or the exogenous spending requirement increases, welfare
at the best implementable separating equilibrium cannot increase. This is
because such a change can either not affect the trade off between profit and
labor taxes, or make it more tight. In the latter case, allocations that were
implementable before the change may not be implementable after. As argued
above, if τ c > τ ∗c,sep, the first best is implementable in a separating equilibrium,
and first best welfare is achieved.
To identify the second best, the government compares welfare at the best
implementable separating equilibrium and at the constrained first best.
Proposition 6. There exists a threshold tax rate on consumption, τminc ∈
[0, τ ∗c,sep) (with
∂τminc
∂s
≥ 0) such that, if τ c < τminc , the government implements
a second best pooling equilibrium with adverse selection; if τ c ≥ τminc , the
government implements a second best separating equilibrium free of adverse
selection. The second best pooling equilibrium with adverse selection is equal
to the constrained first best allocation.
Figure 4.1 visually describes this result. If τ c ≥ τ ∗c,sep, the government can
implement the first best, and vsep(τ c, s) (the thick solid line) is higher than
welfare at the constrained first best, vpool(z∗pool). But suppose τ c falls below
30
τ ∗c,sep, and the government insists on implementing a separating equilibrium.
Because the trade off between higher profit taxes and higher labor taxes - or
between lower research by the low types, and lower research by the high types
(excessively high research in any industry where zsep is selected) - has become
more tight, vsep(τ c, s) decreases. In contrast, vpool(z∗pool) stays constant, be-
cause no such trade off exists at a pooling equilibrium: the government can
always tax labor income to finance the profit subsidy needed to implement
the constrained first best. The threshold τminc is identified as the level of τ c
where the two curves cross. If τ c < τminc , research efforts are so penalised
at a separating equilibrium, that the government finds it worthwhile to al-
low adverse selection, in order to be able to lower the profit tax to encourage
more research. (If the curves do not cross for τ c > 0, then τminc = 0, and the
government always prefers a separating equilibrium). An increase in the ex-
ogenous spending requirement from s to s′ increases τminc in the figure, because
it shifts the function vsep(τ c, s) down to the thick dashed line. This makes the
government more likely to choose an equilibrium with adverse selection.
In connection with the discussion on the effects of competition in Section
3.2, Proposition 6 hints at an interesting interaction between taxation and
competition policy. If taxation policy is so constrained (by a low τ c or a
high s) that the government implements a pooling equilibrium with adverse
selection, this creates an environment in which only the standard Schumpete-
rian link between competition and innovation is present. Then, policies that
favour competition, by decreasing pi, decrease innovation (at least in this simple
model). If, on the contrary, the government is able to implement a separating
equilibrium, more competition may generate more survival of the fittest, and
thus more innovation. In other words, a weakening of fiscal constraints may
make both taxation policy and competition policy more effective.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies tax policy in a model of asymmetric information in the
financing of innovation. In the model, the existence or even the threat of
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Figure 4.1: The second best allocation
adverse selection constrains the research effort of talented entrepreneurs by
raising their cost of capital. A policymaker’s response should be to boost
net-worth and thus make talented entrepreneurs less reliant on outside credit.
However, the source of tax revenue that finances the reduction in labor income
taxes determines to what extent the government should follow this recommen-
dation. Trading off profit and labor income taxes creates a tension between
entrepreneurs’ incentives to pursue research and their need for pledge-able in-
come to avoid adverse selection. Meanwhile, taxing consumption allows the
government to simultaneously subsidize profits and labor income without in-
ducing any additional distortions. Consequently, if the policymaker is suffi-
ciently constrained in his ability to tax consumption, he should not attempt to
implement a “first best” allocation. The necessarily low tax on labor income
would require excessively taxing profits and lowering the rate of innovation.
The modeling approach is simple and straightforward. We do not derive
optimal policy as the solution to a mechanism design problem, opting in favor
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of more realistic and clearly implementable macro policies. On top of this, we
consider only linear tax rates. The literature on economic inequality provides
an important rationale to study non-linear taxation, but that is not the focus
here.
The model’s industrial organization is monopolistic. This assumption rules
out studying the effects of policies when there are heterogeneously constrained
firms competing with each other for market share, a process which naturally
should play an important role in understanding the implications of policy for
economic growth. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that even in its
simple form our model is able to generate an interesting new result on the role
of competition: it provides a new explanation for an inverted-U relationship
between profits and innovation, which is a key result of the empirical literature
on product market competition and growth that the standard Schumpeterian
model cannot address (see ?). Given the pervasiveness of asymmetric infor-
mation in financial markets, it would be important to understand how asym-
metric information interacts with the dynamics of competition; this represents
a promising avenue for future research.
Furthermore, the model is carefully constructed so that the choices across
entrepreneurs (conditional on their type) and firms in different industries are
identical in productivity-adjusted terms. Consequently, it cannot address how
differences in financial constraints affects growth across industries. Although
this is an attractive question, in order to build understanding it is important
first to study the effects of asymmetric information on policy in the most
straightforward environment.
Finally, a politico-economic structure that endogenizes the process through
which government is motivated to pursue policy and how it finances policy
reforms is outside the scope of this paper, but a prime candidate for future
research. An environment where both the origins and consequences of policy
design have a common root in a political process would allow us to understand
why government policy would fail when faced with adverse selection in the
financing of innovation, even if we understood how policy could be reformed.
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A Complete Description of the Benchmark Model
This section describes aspects of the benchmark model omitted from the main
body of the paper.
A.1 Industry equilibrium
The production of the consumption good is perfectly competitive and requires





Yitdi, Yit ≡ (AitLit)1−αXαit, 0 < α < 1.
Consumption good producers maximize profit taking as given the interme-







which implies equilibrium expressions for the industry-specific wage and an
inverse demand curve for intermediate goods







In equilibrium, Lit = L since the supply of industry-specific labor is inelas-
tic.
An investment of Iit consumption goods at t yieldsXi,t+1 = Iit intermediate
goods at t+ 1. The interest rate is 1 + rt+1 (for now, we consider the general
case). The intermediate good is produced by a monopolist, who understands
equation (A.1). At the time of production, the good’s quality Ai,t+1 is pre-
determined. The monopolist chooses Iit to maximize discounted profit

























Πi,t+1 = (1− α)α
1+α
1−α (1 + rt+1)
−1
1−α Ai,t+1L. (A.3)
The contribution of each industry toward the production of the consump-
tion good is driven by the scale of production and technological change. The






















The linearity of the industry-specific equations and the convenience of the no-



















Aitdi. The average wage is








































where µ(zH,zL) was defined in Section 2.3. These normalised variables do not
depend on t once we assume a zero risk-free interest rate.
A.3 Condition for a zero risk-free interest rate
The assumption of linear preferences with a zero discount rate ensures that,
if r = 0, young agents are willing to lend (including equity to themselves)
up to their entire net income, (1 − τw)wL. For the interest rate to be zero
in equilibrium, total demand for credit (both equity and external borrowing),
i(zH , zL) + z, must be lower than (1− τw)wL.
Assumption 3 requires that the minimum labor tax needed to implement
the first best without taxing consumption, τw = 1wL [s − τ ∗pipi] (where τ ∗pi < 0)






z∗L < (1− τw)wL. The assumption
boils down to the requirement that |τ ∗pi | and s be not too large.
Although the minimum labor tax needed to finance τ ∗pi,pool without taxing
consumption, τw = 1wL [s − τ ∗pi,poolpi], is lower than 1wL [s − τ ∗pipi], Assumption
3 is not enough to ensure implementability of the constrained first best, and
Assumption 4 is needed. This is for two reasons. First, implementation of
the constrained first best imposes an additional lower bound on the labor
tax, τw. If τw ≥ 1wL [s − τ ∗pipi], implementation of the constrained first best
requires a higher labor tax (and lower credit supply) than implementation of
the first best. Second, one cannot rule out that total credit demand is higher















Finally, we show that the tax rates mentioned in Assumption 4 always exist,
so that the constrained first best is always implementable. Let τ˜w,pool = 1wL [s−
τ ∗pi,poolpi] be the rate of labor taxation required to finance τ ∗pi,pool without taxing
consumption. There are two possible cases. If τ˜w,pool > τw, then the vector(
τ ∗pi,pool, τ˜w,pool, 0
)′ implements the constrained first best (since it satisfies the
definition of τ ∗pool) without taxing consumption. If τ˜w,pool ≤ τw, then the vector(
τ ∗pi,pool, τw + ,− (τw + − τ˜w,pool) wLc
)′, with  arbitrarily small, implements
the constrained first best (since it satisfies the definition of τ ∗pool) without taxing
consumption (since it implies a subsidy on consumption).
A.4 Discussion of Assumptions
The model has a few assumptions that deserve discussion, namely (1) technol-
ogy enters as a variable in the production of consumption goods rather than
intermediate goods, and (2) labor is industry-specific yet is not an input into
intermediate good production.
In most models of imperfect competition, labor is not an input in the
consumption good production function. By modeling innovations as labor
productivity-augmenting changes in the consumption good production func-
tion, the optimal investment decision of the monopolist becomes linear in
technology. The linearity of the model substantially simplifies the aggregate
and dynamic properties of the economy. For a textbook treatment of this
technique, see ?.
The assumption of industry-specific labor is very important for tractability
considerations. In a model with financial market imperfections, entrepreneurial
net-worth is an important determinant of investment in technological research.
In a common labor market wherein all entrepreneurs are born with equivalent
labor endowments, entrepreneurs earn equivalent labor incomes. On the other
hand, since innovation profits are linear in productivity and an innovating
entrepreneur has monopoly power, the benefit to research is larger for en-
trepreneurs in high versus low productivity industries. Thus, entrepreneurs
with low net-worth in high productivity industries should be more constrained
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than entrepreneurs with high net-worth in low productivity industries. Since
net-worth is equivalent to labor income in the model, and labor income is
equivalent across entrepreneurs in a common labor market, indeed entrepreneurs
would be heterogeneously affected by financial market imperfections if we as-
sumed a common labor market. To avoid this channel, which is not of first
order importance to the themes of this paper and hence not worth the added
complexity, we assume that the labor market for each industry is fragmented.
In this way, net-worth scales with the gains from research in any given indus-
try. One last assumption is crucial to ensure that both the financial market
imperfections symmetrically affect entrepreneurs and that the model has nice
convergence properties: the contribution of some fixed research effort to the
probability of innovation decreases inverse-linearly with the productivity of the
entrepreneur’s industry. Otherwise, an entrepreneur whom did not face suffi-
ciently steep increasing costs to research would expand his research effort until
his probability of innovation approached one (at infinity), whereas he would
invest a negligible share of net-worth on research, implying that the financial
market imperfections would have no effect in steady state. If the increase in
research costs were too steep, the entrepreneur’s desired research effort would
approach zero, and there would not exist a [positive] balanced growth path.
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B Proofs
We begin by establishing a few preliminary results, and we then move to the
proofs of the lemmas and propositions in the main text.
B.1 Preliminary results
Theorem 1. If zˆH(τpi) ≤ (1− τw)w, there only exists a separating equilibrium
in which zJ = zˆJ(τpi) (any combination of equity and external financing being
possible).
Proof. Since the opportunity cost of equity financing is zero, the high types
have enough net worth, and the minimum rate they can be offered on external
financing is 1
aHµ(z)
, the high types would never select a research effort different
from zˆH(τpi). Furthermore, they would never take on external financing at
a rate greater than 1
aHµ(z)
. This last fact implies that a pooling equilibrium
does not exist. As argued in footnote 10, at any separating equilibrium, the
low types must select zˆL(τpi). Then, there only exists a separating equilibrium
in which zJ = zˆJ(τpi). If an entrepreneur of type J borrows any money at
such equilibrium, this must be at a rate 1
aJµ(zˆJ (τpi))
. Then, the entrepreneur
is indifferent as to the amount borrowed, and any combination of equity and
external financing is possible.
The following results focus on the case zˆH(τpi) > (1− τw)w.
Theorem 2. Let zsep and zsep be the minimum and maximum solutions to
n˜pvL(z) = npvL(zˆL), (B.1)
or, if no solutions exist, zsep = zsep = zˆH . Then, for (1− τw)w < zˆH :
1. It is zsep > (1−τw)w if (1−τw)w 6= zˆL, zsep = (1−τw)w if (1−τw)w = zˆL.
2. As (1−τw)w increases from 0 to ω ∈ (zˆL, zˆH), zsep continuously increases
from a value in (0, zˆL) to zˆH , while zsep continuously decreases from a
value above zˆH to zˆH ; they are both constant in (1 − τw)w and equal to
zˆH for (1− τw)w > ω.
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3. There exists zˇ ∈ (zˆL, zˆpool), such that npvH(zsep) 5 npvHpool(zˆpool) ⇐⇒
zsep 5 zˇ .
4. npvH(zsep) 5 npvHpool(zˆpool) ⇐⇒ npvL(zˆL) 5 npvLpool(zˆpool).
Proof. Recall
n˜pvL(z) = aLµ(z)γpi(1− τpi)− aL
aH
z − aH − aL
aH
(1− τw)w,
npvL(zˆL) = aLµ(zˆL)γpi(1− τpi)− zˆL,
and npvL(zˆL) is a positive number. n˜pv
L(z) is a concave function of z, which
is non-positive at z = 0, reaches a unique maximum at z = zˆH , and is negative
for z large enough. It also decreases linearly in (1−τw)w. It is easy to see that,
if (1 − τw)w = 0, it is n˜pvL(zˆL) > npvL(zˆL), implying n˜pvL(zˆH) > npvL(zˆL);
if (1− τw)w = zˆL, it is n˜pvL(zˆL) = npvL(zˆL), implying n˜pvL(zˆH) > npvL(zˆL);
and if (1 − τw)w = zˆH , it is n˜pvL(zˆH) < npvL(zˆL). Then, there exists ω ∈
(zˆL, zˆH) such that, if (1 − τw)w < ω, equation (B.1) admits two solutions,
0 < zsep < zˆH < zsep < ∞; if (1 − τw)w = ω, it admits only one solution,
zsep = zsep = zˆH ; and if (1 − τw)w > ω, it admits no solutions (which, by
definition, still implies zsep = zsep = zˆH). Furthermore, zsep is smaller than
zˆL for (1 − τw)w = 0, increases with (1 − τw)w and goes to zˆH as (1 − τw)w
goes to ω; zsep is bigger than zˆH for (1− τw)w = 0, decreases with (1− τw)w
and goes to zˆH as (1 − τw)w goes to ω. Point 2 follows. Next, note that
n˜pvL((1 − τw)w) = npvL((1 − τw)w). Then, n˜pvL((1 − τw)w) < npvL(zˆL) if
(1−τw)w 6= zˆL, n˜pvL((1−τw)w) = npvL(zˆL) if (1−τw)w = zˆL, Point 1 follows
from the fact that (1 − τw)w < zˆH , and n˜pvL(z) reaches a maximum at zˆH .
Next, the expression
npvH(zsep)− npvHpool(zˆpool) (B.2)
is continuously increasing in zsep. To see this, start from n˜pv
L(zsep) = npv
L(zˆL).
After multiplying both sides by aH
aL
and re-arranging, this can written as























which is increasing in (1 − τw)w and thus zsep. Next, (B.2) is negative for
zsep = zˆL, positive for zsep = zˆpool. To see the former, note that, by point 1,





pool((1−τw)w) = npvH((1−τw)w) = npvH(zsep).
To see the latter, note that npvHpool(zˆpool) < npvH(zˆpool) = npvH(zsep). Point 3
follows. Finally, suppose npvHpool(zˆpool) 5 npvH(zsep). After replacing npvH(zsep)
from equation (B.3) and multiplying both sides by aL
aH
, this can be written as
aLµ(zˆpool)γpi(1− τpi)− aL
a
[zˆpool − (1− τw)w]− (1− τw)w 5
aLµ(zˆL)γpi(1− τpi)− zˆL,
which is the same as npvLpool(zˆpool) 5 npvL(zˆL). Point 4 follows.
Theorem 3. If and only if zsep ≥ zˇ (where zˇ was defined in Theorem 2) the
following is a PBE:
(a) Lenders believe that those who contribute (1− τw)w in equity and invest
z ∈ ((1− τw)w, zsep] are high types; those who contribute (1 − τw)w in
equity and invest z > zsep have equal probability of being high types or
low types; and everybody else are low types. They then offer rate 1
aHµ(z)
to the first group, rate 1
aµ(z)
to the second, and rate 1
aLµ(z)
to the third.
Low types invest zˆL (any combination of equity and external financing
being possible). High types invest zsep (contributing (1− τw)w in equity).
If and only if zsep ≤ zˇ, the following is a PBE:
(b) Lenders have the same beliefs and strategy as in (a). Both high and low
types invest zˆpool (contributing (1− τw)w in equity).
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Proof. Let %J represent type J ’s preferences, and bJ ≥ 0 be the amount
of borrowing that J could have contributed in equity, but did not. Then,
bJ ∈ [0,min ((1− τw)w, zJ)], and the pair (zJ , bJ) uniquely identifies J’s action.
Consider (a) first. Facts AI.-AIII.i. below prove that (a) is a PBE if
zsep ≥ zˇ. Fact AIII.ii. proves that it is not a PBE if zsep < zˇ. AI. For every
action that borrowers could play, the lenders’ action is optimal given their
beliefs. AII. If zsep ≥ zˇ, for actions that borrowers play in equilibrium, the
lenders’ beliefs are correct (since zˆL < (1− τw)w < zsep). AIII.i. If zsep ≥ zˇ,
borrowers do not have a profitable deviation. Type H. Their equilibrium
action, (zsep, 0), gives payoff npvH(zsep). We want to show that (zsep, 0) %H
(zH , bH) for any (zH , bH) 6= (zsep, 0). We proceed in two steps. First, we
show that (zsep, 0) %H (zH , 0) for any zH 6= zsep. To see this, note that, if
zH ∈ [0, zsep), (zH , 0) gives payoff npvH(zH); and zH < zsep ≤ zˆH implies
npvH(zH) < npv
H(zsep). If zH > zsep, (zH , 0) gives payoff npvHpool(zH) ≤
npvHpool(zˆpool), and zsep ≥ zˇ implies npvHpool(zˆpool) ≤ npvH(zsep). Second, we
show that (zH , 0) %H (zH , bH) for any zH > 0 and feasible bH > 0. This follows
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higher if zH > zsep. Type L. Their equilibrium action, (zˆL, b) (with b ∈ [0, zˆL]),
gives payoff npvL(zˆL). We want to show that (zˆL, b) %H (zL, bL) for any
(zL, bL) 6= (zˆL, b). We proceed in two steps. First, we show that (zˆL, b) %H
(zL, bL) for any (zL, bL) such that either zL ≤ (1−τw)w, or bL > 0. To see this,
note that any such (zL, bL) gives payoff npvL(zL), and npvL(zL) ≤ npvL(zˆL).
Second, we show that (zˆL, b) %H (zL, 0) for any (zL, 0) such that zL > (1 −
τw)w. To see this, note that, if zL ∈ ((1− τw)w, zsep], (zL, 0) gives payoff
n˜pvL(zL), and, by definition of zsep, n˜pv
L(zL) < npv
L(zˆL). If zL > zsep, (zL, 0)
gives payoff npvLpool(zL) ≤ npvLpool(zˆpool). But zsep ≥ zˇ implies npvLpool(zˆpool) ≤
npvL(zˆL). AIII.ii. If zsep < zˇ, some borrowers have a profitable deviation. For
example, it is npvHpool(zˆpool) > npvH(zsep), implying that H have a profitable
deviation to (zˆpool, 0).
Next, consider (b). Facts BI.-BIII.i. below prove that (b) is a PBE if
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zsep ≤ zˇ. Fact BIII.ii. proves that it is not a PBE if zsep > zˇ. BI. For
every action that borrowers could play, the lenders’ action is optimal given
their beliefs. BII. If zsep ≤ zˇ, for actions that borrowers play in equilibrium,
lenders’ beliefs are correct (since zsep < zˆpool). BIII.i. If zsep ≤ zˇ, borrowers do
not have a profitable deviation. Type H. Their equilibrium action, (zˆpool, 0),
gives payoff npvHpool(zˆpool). We want to show that (zˆpool, 0) %L (zH , bH) for any
(zH , bH) 6= (zˆpool, 0). We proceed in two steps. First, we show that (zˆpool, 0) %H
(zH , 0) for any zH 6= zˆpool. To see this, note that, if zH ∈ [0, zsep], (zH , 0)
gives payoff npvH(zH), and zH ≤ zsep < zˆH implies npvH(zH) ≤ npvH(zsep);
furthermore, zsep ≤ zˇ implies npvH(zsep) ≤ npvHpool(zˆpool). If zH > zsep, (zH , 0)
gives npvHpool(zH), and npvHpool(zH) ≤ npvHpool(zˆpool). Second, by fact AIII.i.,
it is (zH , 0) %H (zH , bH) for any zH > 0 and feasible bH > 0. Type L.
Their equilibrium action, (zˆpool, 0), gives payoff npvLpool(zˆpool). We want to
show that (zˆpool, 0) %L (zL, bL) for any (zL, bL) 6= (zˆpool, 0). We show this
in two steps. First, we show that (zˆpool, 0) %L (zL, bL) for any (zL, bL) such
that either zL ≤ (1 − τw)w, or bL > 0. To see this, note that any such
(zL, bL) gives payoff npvL(zL). But npvL(zL) ≤ npvL(zˆL), and zsep ≤ zˇ implies
npvL(zˆL) ≤ npvLpool(zˆpool). Second, we show that (zˆpool, 0) %L (zL, 0) for any
(zL, 0) such that zL > (1−τw)w. To see this, note that, if zL ∈ ((1− τw)w, zsep],
(zL, 0) gives payoff n˜pv
L(zL), and, by definition of zsep, n˜pv
L(zL) ≤ npvL(zˆL);
furthermore, zsep ≤ zˇ implies npvL(zˆL) ≤ npvLpool(zˆpool). If zL > zsep, (zL, 0)
gives payoff npvLpool(zL), and npvLpool(zL) ≤ npvLpool(zˆpool). BIII.ii. If zsep > zˇ,
some borrowers have a profitable deviation. For example, it is npvHpool(zˆpool) <
npvH(zsep), implying that H have a profitable deviation to (zsep, 0).
B.2 Proofs
Lemma 1. There exists τw and τw, with −∞ < τw < τw < 1 such that:
• If τw ≤ τw, the high types are unconstrained: a separating equilibrium
realises, where zsep = zˆH(τpi).
• If τw ∈ (τw, τw], the high types are strategically constrained: a separating
equilibrium realises, where zsep ∈ (zˆL(τpi), zˆH(τpi)).
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• If τw > τw, the high types are constrained: a pooling equilibrium realises.
If τw ∈ (τw, τw], zsep is decreasing in τw, increasing in τpi.
Proof. Points 2 and 3 in Theorem 2 imply that there exists ω < ω such that
zsep = zˇ iff (1− τw)w = ω. Let τw ≡ argτ [(1− τw)w = ω] and τw ≡ argτ [(1−
τw)w = ω]. By Theorem 2, if τw ≤ τw, it is zsep = zˆH > zˇ; if τw ∈ (τw, τw], it is
zsep ∈ [zˇ, zˆH); and if τw > τw it is zsep < zˇ. The first part of the Lemma then
follows from Theorem 3. Next, suppose τw ∈ (τw, τw]. Theorem 2 implies that
zsep is decreasing in τw. Differentiating both sides of n˜pv
L(zsep|τ) = npvL(zˆL|τ)






















[aHµ′(zsep)γpi(1− τpi)− 1] > 0,
where we used aLµ′(zˆL)γpi(1− τpi) = 1 to simplify.
Proposition 2. Lowering the tax on profit always boosts research effort by
the low types, and by the high types at a separating equilibrium in which
they are unconstrained (zsep = zˆH(τpi)), or at a pooling equilibrium. At a
separating equilibrium in which the high types are strategically constrained
(zsep < zˆH(τpi)), lowering the labor income tax boosts their research effort,
and so does increasing the tax on profit.
Proof. Since the low types choose zˆL(τpi) at a separating equilibrium and
zˆpool(τpi) at a pooling equilibrium, and the high types choose zˆH(τpi) at a sepa-
rating equilibrium in which they are unconstrained, and zˆpool(τpi) at a pooling
equilibrium, the first part of the proposition follows from equations (2.1) and
(3.2). The second part follows from Lemma 1.
Lemma 5. The function vsep(τ c, s) is non-decreasing in τ c, non-increasing in
s. It is vsep(τ c, s) = v(τ ∗H , τ ∗L) for τ c ≥ τ ∗c,sep.
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Proof. Suppose the exogenous constraint on the consumption tax drops from
τ c to τ ′c (ceteris paribus), and the government enforces a separating equilibrium
both before and after the change. Denote by τ and τ ′ taxes before and after
the change. It is
τpipi + τwwL+ τcc = s,





If τ ′c ≥ τc, welfare must be unchanged. This follows from the fact that,
since τc ≤ τ ′c ≤ τ ′c < τ c, both τ and τ ′ are feasible both before and after the
change. If τ ′c < τc, welfare cannot be higher after the change. This is because,
since τ ′c < τc ≤ τ c, τ ′ was feasible (but not chosen) before the change.
Similarly, suppose the exogenous spending requirement increases from s
to s′ (ceteris paribus), and the government enforces a separating equilibrium
both before and after the change. It is
τpipi + τwwL+ τcc = s,






If τ ′pipi+τ ′wwL ≤ τpipi+τwwL, welfare must be unchanged. This follows from
the fact that both the old and the new allocation are feasible both before and
after the change. To see this, note that τ ′ must be such that τ ′cc− τcc = τpipi+
τwwL− τ ′pipi− τ ′wwL+ s′− s. Then, the new allocation was feasible before the
change by selecting τˆc < τ ′c ≤ τ c such that τˆcc−τcc = τpipi+τwwL−τ ′pipi−τ ′wwL,
τˆw = τ
′
w, and τˆpi = τ ′pi; and the old allocation is feasible after the change by
selecting τ˜c ≤ τ ′c ≤ τ c such that τ˜cc − τcc = s′ − s, τ˜w = τw and τ˜pi = τpi. So,
the new allocation cannot be optimal. If τ ′pipi + τ ′wwL > τpipi + τwwL, welfare
cannot be higher after the change. This is because the new allocation was
feasible (but not chosen) before the change, by selecting τˆc < τc ≤ τ c such
that τˆcc− τcc = τpipi+ τwwL− τ ′pipi− τ ′wwL, τˆw = τ ′w and τˆpi = τ ′pi. Finally, that




L) for τ c ≥ τ ∗c,sep follows from the fact that the first best is
implementable in this case.
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Proposition 6. There exists a threshold tax rate on consumption, τminc ∈
[0, τ ∗c,sep) (with
∂τminc
∂s
≥ 0) such that, if τ c < τminc , the government implements
a second best pooling equilibrium with adverse selection; if τ c ≥ τminc , the
government implements a second best separating equilibrium free of adverse
selection. The second best pooling equilibrium with adverse selection is equal
to the constrained first best allocation.
Proof. If τ c ≥ τ ∗c,sep, vector τ ∗sep is feasible, and the best implementable sepa-








pool(z∗pool). Since vsep(τ c, s) is non-decreasing in
τ c but vpool(z∗pool) is constant, there are two cases: it is either vsep(τ c, s) >
vpool(z∗pool) for τ c ∈ [0, τ ∗c,sep), or vsep(τ c, s) ≥ vpool(z∗pool) for τ c ∈ [τ, τ ∗c,sep),
vsep(τ c, s) < v(z
∗
pool) for τ c ∈ [0, τ). In the second case, τ is non-decreasing in
s, since vsep(τ c, s) is non increasing while v(z∗pool) is constant. Let τminc = 0 in
the first case, τminc = τ in the second case. Then, τ c ≥ τminc guarantees that
vsep(τ c, s) ≥ vpool(z∗pool), τ c < τminc guarantees that vsep(τ c, s) < vpool(z∗pool).
The proposition then follows.
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